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ABSTRACT
Herman Melville’s final novel The Confidence-Man destabilizes conventional Western models of
ethical behavior, particularly Kantian notions of moral agency, by exposing and challenging their
basis in rationality and a progressivist model of history. The Confidence-Man shows rationality
to be nothing more than one way, among many other possible ways, that human beings attempt
to fix the world in their understanding and justify their moral choices. I use these insights from
The Confidence-Man to illuminate Melville’s opposition to the missionaries’ work of civilizing
and Christianizing the South Seas islanders in his earlier travelogues. In Typee, his first novel,
Melville demonstrates that layers of existence—in fact, real human lives—are denied when the
story of human relations is framed as a narrative of progress. This thesis concludes by proposing
that Melville reworks the idea of failure as a potential strategy against the totalizing narrative of
advancing rationalism.
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Introduction
The novels of Herman Melville demonstrate a remarkable preoccupation with narrative

constructs that claim to represent identity and with the limits of what can be known about self
and other. Beginning with Melville’s first publication, Typee: A Peep at Polynesian Life (1846),
we see the signs of a profound unease on the author’s part with regard to the capacity of
literature to express some truth about identity. This concern is amplified within this fictionalized
account of Melville’s stay on the Polynesian island of Nuku Hiva, as it describes a group of
people, the Typees, who are known to the vast majority of Melville’s readers only through
textual documentation—certainly not through any direct contact. Typee’s borrowings from travel
literature and missionary pamphlets at once articulate the knowledge of the non-Western
“savage” that circulated among Melville’s contemporaries and challenge the assumptions that
shaped these perceptions. Typee is a key text that provides a simplified exposition of the larger
problems of representation that become more and more complex as one follows the movement of
Melville’s literary output.
The novels and short stories of the 1850s expand Melville’s inquiry into the limits of
representation. The texts of this period, most notably Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (1851), Pierre;
or, The Ambiguities (1852), “Benito Cereno” (1855), and The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade
(1857), reveal human knowledge and understanding—indeed the potentiality of meaning—to be
nothing more than a culturally enforced system for reading and categorizing what Wai Chee
Dimock has termed the “layer upon layer of imposition and supposition” (406) that is available
to consciousness. The “Etymology” and “Extracts” sections that precede the main narrative of
Moby-Dick, for instance, seem to offer an abundance of information—facts about the whale,
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along with observations and interpretations carefully amassed by the narrator. In the end,
however, the reader is made to notice that this profusion of knowledge ultimately fails to unlock
the significance of the whale itself. Though Ahab urges one to “strike through the mask” (140)—
to puncture the surface and get at the truth behind appearances—he nonetheless introduces
Melville’s reader to the suspicion that beneath the layers of meaning, one finds, after all, nothing.
Pierre, Melville’s unorthodox take on the domestic novel, enacts a bizarre family drama
and love triangle as a means of depicting as inessential those labels, masks, and names typically
used to classify human relations. Pierre adopts terms that would seem to signify permanent,
natural relations—“mother” and “sister,” for instance—and complicates the meanings assigned
to them, sabotaging, in turn, any easy assumptions we might have about “right” and “wrong” in
its treatment of Pierre’s resolve to marry his half-sister. In Pierre, the terms of familial relations
and, subsequently, of moral values are evacuated of the potential for referentiality to any
underlying or essential truth.
The Confidence-Man takes this lacuna as its starting point. It takes for granted a lack of
truth behind the many facades of its title character and of humanity in general, presenting a
world that is thoroughly artificial. It seems that at some point between the writing of Typee and
the novels of the late 1850s, the object of Melville’s interrogation shifts from issues of
epistemology to those of morality, and it is possible to distinguish the set of questions being
raised in Pierre and The Confidence-Man from those raised within the travelogues of the decade
prior. The narrator of Pierre, for one, demonstrates an acute awareness of a fundamental divide
between the issues that trouble the novel’s protagonist and the questions posed by a priest to
which he is compared: “with the priest it was a matter, whether certain bodiless thoughts of his
were true or not true; but with Pierre it was a question whether certain vital acts of his were right
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or wrong” (205). Melville’s novels up to and including Moby-Dick seem, like the priest,
preoccupied with the question, Is there truth behind appearances?—whereas Pierre and The
Confidence-Man rather dispense with this epistemological question and replace it with an ethical
question. These final novels presuppose a universe that either contains no truth or allows no
possibility of accessing any truth behind appearances, and from here they probe what the
impossibility of knowing truth might mean for conceptions of human agency and moral values.
My study examines Typee, Pierre, and The Confidence-Man, tracking the unfolding of a
sustained, though not always consistent, interrogation of the complex interplay of morality, the
interpretation of surfaces, and the construction of power in Melville’s writing. Essaying to clarify
Melville’s hypotheses regarding the ethical implications of a universe emptied of truth, I begin
with a discussion of The Confidence-Man. Chronologically the last of Melville’s novels, it in
many ways instructs on how to read the earlier texts, providing a lens through which the author’s
findings in his earlier works may be brought into greater focus. I suggest that The ConfidenceMan theorizes many of the experiential discoveries of the narrator of Typee with regard to the
ethical questions that both novels raise. I demonstrate, for instance, the ways in which The
Confidence-Man critiques the theoretical assumptions upon which are founded conventional
models of benevolence, such as those described in Typee; it explains what in the earlier text is
simply felt as a vague discomfort on the part of Tommo, the narrator, as he observes the modes
of Western philanthropy at work in the Marquesas. It is therefore important to begin by
clarifying just what these assumptions entail and to identify the questions raised by Melville as a
challenge to them.
Following this discussion, I describe the manner in which Melville opens up his
examination of the triangulated relation of ethics, reading, and power in Typee. The Confidence-
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Man teaches us to see in Melville’s first novel the problems inherent in substituting text for truth;
it orients us towards a richer understanding of Typee by revealing the novel’s opposition to
traditional modes of representation and, more importantly, the injustices that these literary
artifices help to sustain—whether directly or indirectly. I argue, for example, that Typee resists
the bias towards the chronological mapping of cultures, the habit of describing the history of
human relations along a trajectory of progress (from savagery to civilization), and the custom of
writing about non-Western cultures as falling somewhere behind civilization along this line.
With this reading, I hope to contribute to a recognition of the ways in which Melville, from the
beginning of his writing career, yearned to see literature as a vehicle for provoking a dialogue
about the implications of representational norms. Melville shows that layers of existence—in
fact, real human lives—are denied when the story of human relations is framed as a narrative of
progress.
For all its concern with scrutinizing the meaning of morality within this framework, The
Confidence-Man finally ironizes the possibility of real benevolence. It not only insists upon the
absence of truth, it also turns the construction of any ethical program into a joke—laughing, it
seems, in the face of a profound failure. In order to locate in Melville’s writings a viable
alternative to this nihilistic perspective, I turn to Pierre. In the final section of my paper, I
discuss the ways in which Melville’s penultimate novel presents not a means of avoiding moral
failure, but rather a way of understanding failure differently. Targeting the domestic novel in
particular, Pierre uncovers the imperialistic tendencies of Western narrative practices and
explores possible modes of resistance and a different way of restoring moral agency. It presents
failure as a moral option, a means of refusing to participate in the machinations of empire and the
enforcement of sanctioned truth. So much of Pierre, ironically a novel about a novelist, rails
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against novel-writing because of the way it cleans up the contingencies of individuals’ lives and
requires them to fit into an overarching pattern or system. Combined with the insights gained
from The Confidence-Man and Typee, my reading of Pierre suggests that what matters for
Melville is not merely the artificiality of these narrative constructs, but rather the manner in
which they help to sustain the unjust treatment of those who fall outside of the prevailing norm.
Pierre brings to the fore its own insufficiency at fulfilling its readers’ expectations and, in doing
so, makes a claim for the value of choosing failure in the face of the totalizing mechanism of a
progressivist history.

6

2

Reading and ethics in The Confidence-Man
The Confidence-Man is composed of a number of episodes, all of which may be

interpreted as the various encounters of one trickster with the other passengers on board the
riverboat Fidèle. Using an array of disguises, the trickster mingles among the “multiform pilgrim
species” (17) traveling along the Mississippi, soliciting the charity—and just as often provoking
the ire—of his accidental companions. As he trots out one bogus exterior after another, the conman makes it impossible to ascertain whether or not any of these facades reveals his true self, or
whether there is anything at all resembling our common notion of a fixed identity beneath these
artifices. For this reason, it is possible to read The Confidence-Man, alternatively, as a
discontinuous cluster of vignettes, each one self-contained, and each involving a completely
different set of personae altogether. The text is replete with clues, however, that support a
reading that follows the chicanery of one confidence man, as in the third chapter, in which the
con-man, disguised as Black Guinea, describes many of the incarnations he will later take on
(21), or the many instances in which a piece of intelligence about one of the benefactors is
garnered by the con-man under one disguise only to be used to his advantage later on as he takes
on a different persona. Peter Bellis points out, for instance, that the evidence in the text identifies
and characterizes a single confidence man; “[b]ut,” he writes, “the contexts in which such
‘evidence’ appears work to undermine rather than sustain interpretive certainty” (550). The
fundamental ambiguity of the text with regard to the singularity of the confidence-man’s identity
bears mentioning as it contributes to a more general point about selfhood that the narrative
strives to establish. The con-man may well be Black Guinea, or the gentleman with the mourning
weed, or the employee of the Black Rapids Coal Company, or the herb-doctor, or Frank
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Goodman—or he may be all of these, one individual assuming these surface transformations in
series. In any case, the uncertainty built into his characterization serves to create a disconcerting
sense of the unreliability of any outward evidence in substantiating one’s identity.
The microcosm of mid-nineteenth-century American society depicted by The
Confidence-Man is likewise unstable—an ever-shifting world. The fluid Mississippi River
provides the volatile and meandering backdrop to the con-man’s dialogue with his fellow
passengers. The setting is described by the narrator thus:
As pine, beech, birch, ash, hackmatack, hemlock, spruce, basswood, maple,
interweave their foliage in the natural wood, so these varieties of mortals blended
their varieties of visage and garb. A Tartar-like picturesqueness; a sort of pagan
abandonment and assurance. Here reigned the dashing and all-fusing spirit of the
West, whose type is the Mississippi itself, which, uniting the streams of the most
distant and opposite zones, pours them along, helter-skelter, in one cosmopolitan
and confident tide. (17)
The positioning of the novel’s operations upon the serpentine waters of the Mississippi
accentuates the instability of characterization and setting, which is significant both in terms of
the point about the nonessential quality of “visage and garb” that the narrative makes, but also in
terms of the possibilities this affords the con-man as he engages his exploits. An exchange
between the cosmopolitan and the mystic Mark Winsome reveals, indeed, that a “Mississippi
operator” is a term for an “equivocal character” (198)—a synonym for “confidence man.”
Moreover, the novel shows strangeness to be an important feature of riverboat travel—“at every
landing, the huge Fidèle still receives additional passengers in exchange for those that
disembark; so that, though always full of strangers, she continually, in some degree, adds to, or
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replaces them with strangers still more strange” (15)—and the confidence man, as much as the
narrator, uses it to his advantage. Rick Mitchell’s description of the Fidèle is apt: “Constantly in
flux as it prepares to land in the next port, and the next one, where it embarks and disembarks
passengers, the riverboat is also a liminal space which, in The Confidence-Man, is conducive to
strange, ephemeral interactions where instability and deception is the norm” (52). As much as its
passengers, the boat itself may be mistaken for something other than what it is—according to the
narrator, “the Fidèle . . . might at distance have been taken by strangers for some whitewashed
fort on a floating isle” (15)—and the con-man avails himself of the facility for dissimulation that
such strangeness affords.
The constant loading and unloading of the riverboat’s passengers allows for discontinuity
in their characterization, and the novel hyperbolizes this notion of the fluidity of identity to such
a degree that finally every character may be assumed to be affected. So much of the con-man’s
energies must be spent in dispelling doubt precisely because doubt is everywhere. We see this,
for instance, as the man in gray speaks with the wooden-legged man, who is leery of Black
Guinea:
“Tell me, sir, do you really think that a white could look the negro so? For
one, I should call it pretty good acting.”
“Not much better than any other man acts.”
“How? Does all the world act? Am I, for instance, an actor? Is my
reverend friend here, too, a performer?”
“Yes, don’t you both perform acts? To do, is to act; so all doers are
actors.” (40)
The reference, of course, is to Shakespeare’s lines in As You Like It, which are recalled, later on,
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by Frank Goodman as he watches his new acquaintance Charlie Noble suddenly drop the
pretense of friendliness when asked for money:
“All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players,
Who have their exits and their entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts.” (Qtd. in CM 224)
Playing on the interchangeability of the verbs “to do” and “to act,” these characters undermine
the notion of any sincere “doing”—all the world acts, because it cannot do anything else. The
cosmopolitan says to the misanthrope bachelor, “Life is a pic-nic en costume; one must take a
part, assume a character” (139), and later on to the barber, “[D]on’t be too sure what I am. You
call me man, just as the townsfolk called the angels who, in man’s form, came to Lot’s house;
just as the Jew rustics called the devils who, in man’s form, haunted the tombs. You can
conclude nothing absolute from the human form” (225). Neither physical features nor any other
material evidence authenticates the identity of any of the actors on the Fidèle.
As central to the novel as its title character’s efforts to convince others of the
“transparency” of identity is the work that the novel does to replace this “transparency” with
obscurity—what in Moby-Dick is represented by the inscrutable “whiteness of the whale.” With
regard to the truth of identity, the novel trades description or explanation for a series of
questions: “What are you? What am I? Nobody knows who anybody is. The data which life
furnishes, towards forming a true estimate of any being, are as insufficient to that end as in
geometry one side given would be to determine the triangle” (194). When Frank Goodman’s
appeal to Charlie produces no monetary boon, Charlie’s departure shows him “seeming
disdainfully to throw off the character he had assumed,” leaving Frank to wonder “where exactly
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the fictitious character had been dropped, and the real one, if any, resumed” (223-24). Character
is something that can be assumed and dropped at will, and a reading of some critical responses to
the novel is helpful in developing a sense of the wider significance of this lack of authenticity.
Susan Ryan focuses her examination of the novel’s “ambiguities of benevolence” on
moments in The Confidence-Man in which charitable acts are destabilized precisely through
Melville’s emphasis on the nonessential quality of surface appearances. The concept and practice
of charity is of central importance in the novel, and the trickster’s multifarious dealings with the
other passengers on the Fidèle invoke an array of definitions for the word. Hershel Parker and
Mark Niemeyer’s annotations for the opening chapter, for example, point out the ways in which
“Melville blurs the New Testament sense of charity (love) into something like the common sense
of benevolence or generosity toward the poor” (11). Instances of charity-seeking include Black
Guinea’s “pitch-penny game” (19), the merchant who spins a tale of sorrow to prevail upon Mr.
Roberts to “[draw] from his wallet a bank note” (30), and the importunities of the man in gray on
behalf of the Seminole Widow and Orphan Asylum as well as his proposal of the World’s
Charity at the London fair, to cite only a few. In fact, the novel proffers so many different
manifestations of charity that ultimately it seems the only feature common to all the distinct
enactments of the word is the way in which the choice whether or not to engage in a charitable
gesture is always contingent upon the potential benefactor’s reading of the confidence man.
Charity is thus revealed to have a fraught connection with the problems of reading the
world of appearances, as the confidence man elicits the largesse of the other passengers through
multiple surfaces of seemingly intelligible identities. David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder argue
that “Melville takes up these critiques of visual assessment in order to foreground the deceptions
of bodies” (37), and Ryan describes the anxieties produced by the potential for dissimulation that
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the text presents. According to Ryan, antebellum white Americans “tended to see the intrusion of
artifice into their acts of benevolence as troubling, even malignant,” suggesting that the
“possibility that one might be tricked into aiding the unworthy often occasioned an anxious
interrogation of charitable practices” (685). There is much at stake in determining the true
identity of a supplicant, since a misreading of a supplicant could potentially turn the tables on
those who considered themselves “arbiters of need” (693). In Ryan’s formulation, the duplicity
of someone like the confidence man, “because it called into question the validity of donors’
perceptions and judgments, worked to unsettle the hierarchies structuring benevolent exchange”
(692). Thus, within each character solicited by the con-man, the novel makes palpable a “natural
struggle between charity and prudence” (CM 53), the feeling of being obliged to demand the
vouchsafe of “documentary proof, any plain paper” (21) before giving alms—for if a benefactor
could be duped into aiding the unworthy, then the management of this exchange would no longer
be in his or her power. It falls under the control of the vagrant, the one who possesses the ability
to manipulate appearances.
Melville’s particular unease with conventional morality is seen to derive from an anxiety
that is concomitant with our reading processes. If, as Bellis points out, the body of a beggar such
as Guinea is “a text whose interpretation will establish its reality as a body” (559), then it follows
that enacting charity—in the sense of “benevolence or generosity,” as well as “tolerance” and
“trust,” or, more generally, “goodness”—is, in The Confidence-Man, completely reliant upon our
interpretations of surface appearance. The novel shows that any attempt to answer the question
of the practicability of charity—the possibility of doing any real good—must grapple with the
potential of misinterpretation.
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Elizabeth Renker draws a suggestive parallel between the character of the confidence
man and the novel of the same name. She suggests that the two “operate analogously: just as the
Confidence-Man’s constant changes of identity baffle the perceptions of the other characters,
The Confidence-Man baffles the reader with a bewildering proliferation of characters and
descriptions” (117)—that is, they perform the same sort of work, as the body of the confidence
man and the body of the text, in a similar fashion, produce readers. Insofar as we can see that
charitable actions and our ability to navigate through textual material are fast entwined, we can
also see that both charity and reading have a powerful way of luring us into believing that it is
possible to perform a “correct” reading of a text or of another’s identity—that in the profusion of
data and sense impressions available to us, some underlying truth awaits our recognition. The
bait, however, is set only in order to expose how readily we are conned by this fiction.
At several moments, The Confidence-Man conducts the reader to a recognition of the
textual quality of itself—of itself as a novel—as well as the reader’s position as the reader of that
text. Chapters 14 and 33, in particular, call attention to this relation of reader to text, chiefly by
anticipating the reader’s objection to the novel’s failure to satisfy readerly expectations for the
novel with regard to consistency of characterization. “It may be urged,” the narrator offers, “that
there is nothing a writer of fiction should more carefully see to, as there is nothing a sensible
reader will more carefully look for, than that, in the depiction of any character, its consistency
should be preserved” (75). In addition, the narrator suggests, the reader looks for realism,
exacting a “severe fidelity to real life” and objecting, he imagines, to “[h]ow unreal all this is”
(186). One implication that emerges has to do with the common assumption that consistency is a
mark of truth—the more consistent a character is, the more we see him as being “realistic,” as
“telling the truth”—as well as the reciprocal notion, that inconsistency signals untruth. These
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equations are inverted in the novel, as the narrator challenges novelistic portrayals that seek to
convince readers of their realism by describing characters that are unchanging, whose actions
and words always hold together:
That fiction, where every character can, by reason of its consistency, be
comprehended at a glance, either exhibits but sections of character, making them
appear for wholes, or else is very untrue to reality; while, on the other hand, that
author who draws a character, even though to common view incongruous in its
parts, as the flying-squirrel, and, at different periods, as much at variance with
itself as the caterpillar is with the butterfly into which it changes, may yet, in so
doing, be not false but faithful to facts. (75)
For Melville, the “revelation of human nature on fixed principles” (76) is a lie, and not the
merely amusing and mostly irreproachable kind of lie that fiction might be taken to be, but an
insidious and, as we shall see, destructively totalizing kind of lie. Ryan’s analysis of the system
of benevolent exchange, set alongside Melville’s critique of representation—and the
accountability that he attaches to it—brings to the surface the extent to which the notion of
charity in his last novel is imbricated with our readerly expectations and, moreover, with our
investment in hierarchies of power within human relations. In calling attention to this process of
reading and responding to the text, the novel indicates not just the complexity of the relationship
between reader and text—not just the problems of reading—but also the attendant implications
when that readerly relationship forms the foundation of a metaphysics of morality.
At bottom, Melville is grappling with the Kantian project of grounding a system of
benevolent exchange upon the assumption that truth exists and that we can know it. By pointing
out the inescapability of misreading the available “evidence” and mistaking our reading for truth,

14
Melville complicates this founding assumption. If it is true, as Bellis has argued, that “[b]odies
and texts are . . . inseparable, indistinguishable, and equally inconclusive” (559) in the world of
The Confidence-Man, we are faced with the following question: What does it mean to be good—
or, to use the novel’s vocabulary, charitable—in a world comprised of surfaces that must be
read?
Melville’s body of work demonstrates a deep suspicion of Kantian ethics, which places
the argument for an a priori basis for morality within just such a problematic system of
(mis)representation and (mis)reading. For Kant, if ethics is at all possible, it must be derivable
from a universal principle—“the supreme principle of morality” (5)—meaning that “our
knowledge of it is independent of any particular experience.” In other words, ethics cannot be
based on experience, “for we can have no experience of every possible event”—it can be known
“on the basis of reasoning alone” (ix-x). The Confidence-Man complicates the basis of this
ethical system because reason is revealed in the novel to be just one of many possible
(mis)readings that we perform on the world as it appears to us. As Christine Korsgaard explains,
for Kant, “the laws of reason are not something we find in the world, but rather something we
human beings impose upon the world” (xxiv). Inasmuch as Melville’s last published novel
expresses a cynicism towards charitable acts, the real thrust is directed at the artifice—
rationality—that motivates the enactment of philanthropy. If we impose labels, masks, and
names upon the raw material of subjective experience—and I argue below that Melville insists
upon not only the reality, but indeed the violence, of this imposition, as early as Typee—and if
all we have access to are surfaces and appearances, then reason cannot be anything more than
another interpretive method or reading process with which we attempt to fix the world in our
understanding and then justify our moral choices.
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This may go some way towards explaining the joke in Moby-Dick, which advocates
dispensing altogether with Kant, who is represented as the ponderous whale’s head hoisted upon
the ship’s side along with another head representing John Locke, also a rationalist:
So, when on one side you hoist in Locke’s head, you go over that way; but now,
on the other side, hoist in Kant’s and you come back again; but in very poor
plight. Thus, some minds for ever keep trimming boat. Oh, ye foolish! throw all
these thunder-heads overboard, and then you will float light and right. (261)
Jokes aside, Melville takes it rather seriously that Kantian ethics applies only insofar as we are
rational beings. “In a practical philosophy,” writes Kant, “where we have to do not with
assuming grounds for what happens but rather laws for what ought to happen even if it never
does, that is, objective practical laws,” it is unnecessary to take into account any aspects—for
example, pleasure or displeasure—that belong “to an empirical doctrine of the soul.” He is
concerned only with the “question of objective practical laws and hence of the relation of a will
to itself insofar as it determines itself only by reason” (36). In Melville’s novels, we detect
numerous signals that this rationalist account of moral compulsion is inadequate.
Rather than a direct censure of rationality as such, The Confidence-Man achieves its
critique of Kant’s ethics through a rascally method—an indirect and illogical one, even—that
unsettles rationality’s bias in favor of objectivity and logical consistency. Already, we have
noted the narrator’s summary dismissal of the reader’s demand for consistency, in his arch
commentary on the lack of consistency with regard to human character in reality. According to
Mitchell and Snyder, “the narrator cites the non-normative productions of nature as his proof that
consistent characterization is nothing more than literary market convention” (57). The novel
favors the creation of “duck-billed characters”—illogical and inconsistent figures that express
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the complexity and downright unreadability of identity—and argues: “he, who, in view of its
inconsistencies, says of human nature . . . that it is past finding out, thereby evinces a better
appreciation of it than he who, by always representing it in a clear light, leaves it to be inferred
that he clearly knows all about it” (76). Likewise, Charlie rebuffs Frank’s entreaties for a loan
because, he asserts, there is no consistency in individuals—though his wording contrives to make
it seem as though he refuses to grant the loan rather for Frank’s sake than his own:
“Would you, in your present need, be willing to accept a loan from a friend,
securing him by a mortgage on your homestead, and do so, knowing that you had
no reason to feel satisfied that the mortgage might not eventually be transferred
into the hands of a foe? Yet the difference between this man and that man is not
so great as the difference between what the same man be to-day and what he may
be in days to come. For there is no bent of heart or turn of thought which any man
holds by virtue of an unalterable nature or will.” (222)
Charlie’s report of the misfortunes of China Aster corroborates his opinion that the illusion of
consistency in human characterization is not to be trusted. China Aster turns victim through a
“friendly loan” (221) from Orchis, as Orchis changes from generous benefactor to merciless
usurer, demonstrating what he himself calls “the unstableness and deceitfulness of the human
heart” (217).
In The Confidence-Man, if anyone could be described as at all objective and consistent,
we could only point to those “practical Christians” designated by the Missourian bachelor, which
are, of course, machines. The man from the Philosophical Intelligence Office—yet another of the
con-man’s incarnations—solicits the Missourian, marketing, as he claims, some trustworthy boys
and men of whose dependable labor the farmer could avail himself on his fields. The Missourian
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proves “a hard case,” having “[n]o confidence in boys, no confidence in men, no confidence in
nature”: “I have confidence in distrust,” he declares (113). For the Missourian, the inconsistency
of human character renders all individuals unworthy of trust—rascals all, in his view—and
therefore he places his confidence instead upon machines:
“[C]ider-mill, mowing-machine, corn-husker—all faithfully attend to their
business. Disinterested, too; no board, no wages; yet doing good all their lives
long; shining examples that virtue is its own reward—the only practical Christians
I know.” (120)
Besides providing a sardonic commentary on the superiority of machines to human beings in
terms of providing constant and reliable service, this passage makes it clear that objectivity and
consistency, the markers of moral value under a rational philosophy, belong in the realm of
machines, not man. As I suggest below in the discussion of Typee, Melville often equates the
mechanical “virtue” of constancy with the overarching ambition of Christianizing the entire
world, which clarifies further why Christians are targeted in this passage. For now, suffice it to
say that the Missourian’s caustic praise of machines promotes a re-evaluation of the linearity of
objective that a rationalist ethics demands.
Martha Nussbaum has pointed out that one of the limitations of Kant’s ethics has to do
with the notion that a moral law or principle “can never conflict with another moral rule” (31).
According to Nussbaum:
The requirement that objective practical rules be in every situation consistent,
forming a harmonious system like a system of true beliefs, overrides for Kant our
intuitive feeling (which he acknowledges) that there is a genuine conflict of
duties. . . . To say anything else would, for Kant, be to weaken the strong
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conceptual bond between duty and practical necessity, and between both and
logical consistency. (31-2)
Interestingly, Nussbaum advocates attending to “our intuitive feeling” when it comes to making
moral judgments as an alternative to relying solely upon the principles of logic and consistency.
For Nussbaum, as for Melville, a truly viable ethical program has to take seriously the
multiplicity of allegiances, the multifarious and often contradictory commitments possessed by
an individual at any given moment.
Melville makes it clear, particularly in the exchanges between Charlie and Frank, that
“the best man, as the worst, is subject to all mortal contingencies” (CM 222). Morality is a
difficult matter precisely because individuals have many allegiances—moral commitment is
never a matter of following a straight line leading to a single objective. Charlie and Frank
demonstrate the conflict that ensues as one attempts to reconcile the demands of friendship and
those of business, for example. Frank presses on with his supplication for a loan from Charlie—
now that they are “business friends,” he pleads, surely Charlie will trust him with a sum of
money. In return, Charlie pointedly asks him, “Are you a centaur?” (206) by way of implying the
flight of fancy it takes to reconcile the dictates of business with those of true friendship. Frank
objects:
“Oh, Charlie! you talk not to a god, a being who in himself holds his own estate,
but to a man who, being a man, is the sport of fate’s wind and wave, and who
mounts towards heaven or sinks towards hell, as the billows roll him in trough or
on crest.” (207)
Frank ends up confirming, rather than contradicting, Charlie’s position, that an important feature
of being human—rather than a god or a machine—is being unceasingly compelled by multiple
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loyalties, many of which conflict with one another. And if this is true, then an ethical system that
glosses over the multiplicity of ties proves impracticable.
A further critique of rationalist ethics is found in the exchange between the man in gray
and the gentleman with gold sleeve-buttons, in which the con-man purports to have devised a
logical solution to the problem of want. He describes his prospectus for an institution that will
impose the universalization of benevolence:
“The World’s Charity is to be a society whose members shall comprise
deputies from every charity and mission extant; the one object of the society to be
the methodization of the world’s benevolence; to which end, the present system of
voluntary and promiscuous contribution to be done away, and the Society to be
empowered by the various governments to levy, annually, one grand benevolence
tax upon all mankind . . .” (47-8)
The con-man’s proposition carries to its logical extreme the notion of an ethics that applies only
insofar as we are rational. In his justification of a society in which charity will be universally
enforced, he appeals to reason to validate the practicability of such a project—but the gentleman
responds in a manner that again serves to undermine our assumptions regarding the rationality of
individuals:
“[A]dmit, as you must, that mankind is not mad, and my project is
practicable. For, what creature but a madman would not rather do good than ill,
when it is plain that, good or ill, it must return upon himself?”
“Your sort of reasoning,” said the good gentleman adjusting his gold
sleeve-buttons, “seems all reasonable enough, but with mankind it wont do.”
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“Then mankind are not reasoning beings, if reason wont do with them.”
(49)
The argument of the man in gray in favor of the World’s Charity is founded on the assumption
that human beings are rational—he resembles Kant maintaining that benevolence is the product
of reason. The gentleman, however, questions the validity of this assumption. The gentleman’s
retort, and finally the confidence man’s conclusion as well, illustrates the absurdity of installing
our set of expectations regarding individuals’ capacity for benevolence within the premise of an
inherent rationality.
Significantly, the continuation of this exchange makes it clear that the logical end of a
universalizing institution of benevolence is ultimately its own demise, as the trickster figures:
“[I]n fourteen years, as I estimate, there would have been devoted to good works
the sum of eleven thousand two hundred millions; which would warrant the
dissolution of the society, as that fund judiciously expended, not a pauper or
heathen could remain the round world over.” (48)
Surmising that all citizens the world over—being rational persons, all—will readily submit to the
methodization of charitable giving that he proposes, the con-man envisions a time when the
World’s Charity will have amassed and re-distributed such wealth that it will have eliminated
poverty altogether and thus rendered itself obsolete. Paradoxically, as the con-man projects the
logical end of the institution’s project of universal benevolence, he arrives at the inevitability of
its dissolution.
The critique of universalism here prefigures the section in which Frank expounds to
Charlie the necessary ubiquity of “geniality” in the modern world:
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“By the way, talking of geniality, [remarks Charlie,] it is much on the
increase in these days, ain’t it?”
“It is, and I hail the fact. Nothing better attests to the advance of the
humanitarian spirit. In former and less humanitarian ages—the ages of
amphitheaters and gladiators—geniality was mostly confined to the fireside and
table. But in our age—the age of joint-stock companies and free-and-easies—it is
with this precious quality as with precious gold in old Peru, which Pizarro found
making up the scullion’s sauce-pot as the Inca’s crown. Yes, we golden boys, the
moderns, have geniality everywhere—a bounty broadcast like noonlight.”
“True, true; my sentiments again. Geniality has invaded each department
and profession. We have genial senators, genial authors, genial lecturers, genial
doctors, genial clergymen, genial surgeons, and the next thing we shall have
genial hangmen.” (181)
The discussion takes an interesting turn as the cosmopolitan protracts the idea of a merely
prevalent geniality all the way, again, to its logical extreme—it now “has invaded each
department and profession” as a universal principle and everyone in the world is genial. And, as
with the institution of the World’s Charity, the universalization of the quality of geniality results
in a certain dissolution:
“As to the last-named sort of person,” said the cosmopolitan, “I trust that
the advancing spirit of geniality will at last enable us to dispense with him. No
murderers—no hangmen. And surely, when the whole world shall have been
genialized, it will be as out of place to talk of murderers, as in a Christianized
world to talk of sinners.” (182)
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One has to wonder what exactly it means to “dispense with” the hangman altogether—must we
hang the hangman? In its elimination of difference, the universalizing principle that undergirds
both the World’s Charity and the “genialization” of all men ultimately follows the trajectory of
dissolution or death, though this time not of the system itself, but rather of human beings. Charlie
seems on the verge of apprehending this inevitability, as he ruminates, “[E]very blessing is
attended with some evil, and—” (182), at which point the cosmopolitan cuts him off before he
can finish the thought.
What Charlie is prevented from articulating—the evil that attends the “blessing” of a
thoroughly genialized society—is, I wish to argue, the vision of colonial depredation that
Melville describes in Typee. The cosmopolitan’s hope for an entire world that has been
genialized echoes the mission of converting and civilizing the inhabitants of the South Seas
islands. The Confidence-Man invites us to recognize that a project aimed at universally enforcing
some idealized characteristic will likely be accomplished at the cost of many individuals’ lives.
Thus, the treatment of the world’s genialization in this section works to unsettle what we might
routinely think of as the promise of conversion and reform.
Augmenting these disturbing observations, The Confidence-Man discloses an
undercurrent of violence that often bears up the commitment to refashion individuals. Melville
suggests that remaking “natural man”—the project undertaken by the missionaries in the South
Seas and other places—more often than not involves some enactment of violence. In an early
episode, the character of the Methodist threatens to “teach charity” to the wooden-legged man,
and makes clear his meaning by “suddenly catching this exasperating opponent by his shabby
coat-collar, and shaking him till his timber-toe clattered on the deck like a nine-pin” (23).
Similarly, the story of Goneril—particularly the analysis of her tale by the man from the Black
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Rapids Coal Company—demonstrates a connection between violence and conversion, as he
remarks, suggestively:
“The truth probably was that she was a wife with some blemishes mixed with
some beauties. But when the blemishes were displayed, her husband, no adept in
the female nature, had tried to use reason with her, instead of something far more
persuasive. Hence his failure to convince and convert.” (71)
Violence, the con-man implies, is the expedient required for a hasty and thorough modification
of Goneril’s deficiency of virtue. Even more extreme, the Missourian farmer, denouncing all
manservants and boys as rascals, calls for their annihilation outright—he longs for the day when
machines will finally “announce the era when that refractory animal, the working or serving
man, shall be a buried by-gone, a superseded fossil.” He continues, fantasizing:
“Shortly prior to which glorious time, I doubt not that a price will be put upon
their peltries as upon the knavish ’possums, especially the boys. Yes, sir (ringing
his rifle down on the deck), I rejoice to think that the day is at hand, when,
prompted to it by law, I shall shoulder this gun and go out a boy-shooting.” (121)
Indeed, the tacit as well as the unequivocal affirmation of violence as a condition of reform or
conversion can be found in many exchanges throughout the text. As the confidence man
propounds the excellence of a project of universal benevolence, he suggests rather than describes
the exclusionary vehemence that such a project would entail. “You see,” he says,
“this doing good to the world by driblets amounts to just nothing. I am for doing
good to the world with a will. I am for doing good to the world once for all and
having done with it. Do but think, my dear sir, of the eddies and maëlstroms of
pagans in China. People here have no conception of it. Of a frosty morning in
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Hong Kong, pauper pagans are found dead in the streets like so many nipped peas
in a bin of peas. To be an immortal being in China is no more distinction than to
be a snow-flake in a snow-squall. What are a score or two of missionaries to such
a people? A pinch of snuff in the kraken. I am for sending ten thousand
missionaries in a body and converting the Chinese en masse within six months of
the debarkation. The thing is then done, and turn to something else.” (50)
This picture of rapid conversion sits comfortably only with one who expects to find the Chinese
willing—absolutely yearning—to be converted. Such an ambitious undertaking in reality would
always entail the use of force to suppress those who resist conversion, and the project of “doing
good to the world with a will” and “having done with it” is ultimately a project of destruction.
In his reading of Typee, Mitchell Breitwieser suggests that “Melville feels special
resentment toward the missionaries who, pretending to exercise Christian sympathy for the
victims of power, are actually rendering the islanders pliable by shaming them out of indigenous
and cultural traditions” (18). But more so, The Confidence-Man makes it clear that Melville takes
issue with the outright violence that the mission seems to require. The con-man’s numerous
exchanges with the other passengers suggest that a universalizing principle—whether it aims at a
telos of universal benevolence, or geniality, or reason—seems to arc deathward. I argue that this
deathward arc indicates an important link between The Confidence-Man and Melville’s
portrayals of the missionary program in Typee. The real problem with the “nominal” conversion
of the Marquesans is that it covers over the deaths of thousands of islanders and the brutal
expropriation of their territory by “the rapacious hordes of enlightened individuals who settle
themselves within its borders, and clamorously announce the progress of Truth” (Typee 195).
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3

Fictions of reform in Typee
Claiming to represent “the unvarnished truth” (2) about the Marquesas and their

inhabitants, indeed presenting itself as an autobiographical or even an anthropological account of
the author’s sojourn in Nuku Hiva in 1842, Typee contests the primacy of Enlightenmentinspired descriptions of the civilizing mission in the remote islands. Early on, Melville
demonstrates an awareness of “something decidedly wrong” (198) in the depictions of the South
Seas islanders and the practical operations of the Polynesian Mission. His stay on Nuku Hiva has
allowed him to discern a troubling discrepancy between published accounts of the Mission and
what he witnesses on the island directly. “To read pathetic accounts of missionary hardships, and
glowing descriptions of conversions, and baptisms taking place beneath palm-trees, is one
thing,” he writes, but to go there “and see the missionaries dwelling in picturesque and prettilyfurnished coral-rock villas, whilst the miserable natives are committing all sorts of immoralities
around them, is quite another” (198). Furthermore, he contrasts his own observations of the
Typees’ daily practices and ceremonial rituals with “horrible descriptions of Polynesian worship
which we have received in some published narratives, and especially in those accounts of the
evangelized islands with which the missionaries have favored us.” Tongue firmly in cheek,
Tommo, the narrator of Typee, inveighs, “Did not the sacred character of these persons render
the purity of their intentions unquestionable, I should certainly be led to suppose that they had
exaggerated the evils of Paganism, in order to enhance the merit of their own disinterested
labors” (169).
Melville’s writing career begins at a time when the literary market, as much as the
American imagination, is dominated by accounts of the progress of civilization in the New
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Worlds. It is helpful to turn briefly to John Samson’s study of Melville’s “factual” narratives—
the travelogues of the 1840s—in which he describes the influence on Typee of explorers’ and
missionaries’ accounts of the Pacific paradise. From these narrative models, it appears Tommo
borrows the assignation of a “chronological condition” upon the native inhabitants he
encounters. Samson suggests that for the sailors and missionaries, the Marquesas represented a
kind of Eden, signifying “the time and characteristics of man before the Fall, to be regained only
through the Christianization of the New Worlds” (35). Implicit in this view is the idea that the
movement of history favors the direction of progress, of better and better—“a line progressing
from Eden lost to Eden regained” (35). As Melville’s contemporaries attempted to figure out
how to map their contact with other peoples in remote settings, their writings were largely
informed by—and helped to sustain, in turn—a progressivist model of history. Thus, for
example, assigning the terms “primitive” and “savage” to a native of non-European locales
comes to be a common practice, indicating a notion of “people in their first state, somewhere
back of ‘civilized’ people on the line of history” (37).
While Melville borrows heavily from travel literature and popular first-hand accounts of
the missionary undertaking in the South Seas, he does so in a manner that complicates many of
their assumptions. Typee has an ambivalent and often confused relationship with these narrative
models: it at once assimilates and resists their assumptions, particularly with regard to the
meanings of “civilized” and “savage.” For instance, upon landing on Nuku Hiva, the narrator and
his companion cycle through reports they have heard and read about the inhabitants of the island:
the Happar are said to “cherish the most friendly relations with the inhabitants” of the island, and
the Typee are known as dreaded savages who “appear to inspire the other islanders with
unspeakable terrors” (24). Thus, when they encounter the native couple who lead them through
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the valley, the question foremost on their minds is “Typee or Happar?”—both believing that the
answer promises either their good fortune, if Happar it is, or the realization of their greatest fears,
if Typee (69). But the Typee they are finally faced with upends all of their expectations; Tommo
is astonished by their kind hospitality and the attentions they generously lavish upon the visitors.
In other ways, too, Typee inverts the notion of a progression “from Eden lost to Eden
regained”—the concept of history tracing a predominantly linear movement towards
universality, coherence, and perfection. For instance, its depiction of Tommo and Toby’s fall
into the Edenic valley of the Typees reverses Adam and Eve’s fall out of Eden: rather than
looking forward to a life of toil following the fall, Tommo and Toby instead look backward, in
Samson’s words, “to the ‘labors’ that brought them to Typee” (37). For Melville, the story of
progress—the goal of which, according to Bernhard Radloff, is “the ever more thorough
rationalization of the world” (1)—needs to be re-assessed because it determines, in many
instances, the manner of our interaction with others whom we place elsewhere along the line of
progress, particularly those whom we regard as being chronologically behind the civilized world
and therefore inferior. Melville takes on this particular misreading of human relations because he
has witnessed first-hand the ways in which it serves to justify the subjugation of populations
such as the inhabitants of the Marquesas. By reversing the prevailing mythologies and subverting
the standard categories used to define other communities, Melville seeks to establish an alternate
method of intercultural engagement.
Additionally, The Confidence-Man makes clear the manner in which the teleological
model of history is closely allied with the rhetoric of reform. The myth of progressive man calls
for the emancipation of “primitive” peoples from their unenlightened state in the name of
advancing civilization. As I suggest above, Kant locates the terms of this emancipation within
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the teleology of reason. Believing, as Radloff puts it, in the “emancipatory power of the project
of a universal history” (122), Kant understands modernity as the program of advancing
rationalism. In contrast, Melville ironizes the mere possibility of emancipation in Typee,
identifying instead a relationship of victimization and contamination as the primary consequence
of the teleological principle of historical process.
One recalls Tommo’s embittered injunction against the imposition of the French upon the
Marquesas and their manner of “reforming” the inhabitants:
The French had then held possession of the Marquesas some time, and already
prided themselves upon the beneficial effects of their jurisdiction, as discernible
in the deportment of the natives. To be sure, in one of their efforts at reform they
had slaughtered about a hundred and fifty of them at Whitihoo—but let that pass.
(7)
Stephen de Paul, writing on Melville’s depiction of the Christian mission in Tahiti in the sequel
to Typee, similarly points out that while “[t]he purpose of the missionary program of
‘denationalizing the Tahitians’ was moral improvement,” the practical consequence of it is, from
Melville’s perspective, “the erosion of a whole society” (56). The aspiration for universality,
coherence, and perfection that informs the rhetoric of reform is insupportable in Melville’s early
novels—not only because it ends in an eradication of difference in the abstract, but because it
results in, as well as justifies, the annihilation of entire populations of people.
Therefore, against the model of a progressive history, Melville’s travelogues deploy—as
does The Confidence-Man—what some critics have termed a “rover” ethic, a wandering
perspective that resists linearity, resists being governed by the norms of any particular trope or
genre. These texts, moreover, refuse any serious political or religious allegiance, and likewise
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repudiate reductive hierarchic binaries, as we have seen in the treatment of the terms “civilized”
and “savage.” Tommo protests, “How often is the term ‘savages’ incorrectly applied!” (27), in a
manner that serves both to loosen the customary attachment of the term to any non-European and
to recast his own countrymen under the same designation. He points out a fallacy in many
accounts of “cold-blooded robberies, kidnappings, and murders” perpetrated by natives upon
travelers in the Pacific:
[H]ow we sympathize for the unhappy victims, and with what horror do we regard
the diabolical heathens, who, after all, have but avenged the unprovoked injuries
which they have received. We breathe nothing but vengeance, and equip armed
vessels to traverse thousands of miles of ocean in order to execute summary
punishment upon the offenders. On arriving at their destination, they burn,
slaughter, and destroy, according to the tenor of written instructions, and sailing
away from the scene of devastation, call upon all Christendom to applaud their
courage and their justice. (27)
The reports of native brutality that infuse Americans’ imaginings of foreign encounters often
conceal the abominable actions of the visitors that provoked them in the first place. Ruefully,
Tommo surmises in another chapter, “The missionaries may seek to disguise the matter as they
will, but the facts are incontrovertible; and the devoutest Christian who visits that group with an
unbiased mind, must go away mournfully asking—‘Are these, alas! the fruits of twenty-five
years of enlightening?’” (124) This passage, moreover, pointedly observes that the destruction of
the natives’ habitation is authorized by “written instructions,” reminding one of the manner in
which Melville connects moral behavior and textuality in The Confidence-Man.
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In Typee, Melville’s attack against the missionary endeavor seems founded upon the very
same anxieties that inform the system of benevolent exchange depicted in The Confidence-Man.
In part, the text serves a cautionary purpose, warning western philanthropists, who buy into the
published testimonies of conversion and the progress of civilization, against the instability of
charitable offerings, which results from the problems of misrepresentation, both intentional and
unintentional. “Those who from pure religious motives contribute to the support of this
enterprise,” urges Tommo, “should take care to ascertain that their donations, flowing through
many devious channels, at last effect their legitimate object” (198). More than a cautionary tale,
however, Typee activates what seems to be an incipient awareness of the problematic connection
between our practices of representation and reading on the one hand, and the possibility of
enacting our good intentions on the other. Examining the early development of this particular
awareness, it is evident from the beginning of his writing career that Melville is intensely
preoccupied with the potential of a text to manipulate the philanthropic impulses of its readers.
Typee thus paints a picture of civilization as a text upon which the problems of reading
and of ethics intersect, and often collide. It is clear at this point that Melville’s critique of
confidence in his final novel is ultimately—to use Radloff’s phrasing—“directed against the
fundamental lie of philanthropy, and the ‘bene-volence’ it claims to represent” (4). In Typee, as
in The Confidence-Man, whether it is being called “charity” or “benevolence”—philanthropy, in
any particular instance, is always imbricated with the ideology of reform and the progressivist
assumptions that buttress it. Radloff emphasizes, “The cosmopolis of The Confidence-Man . . .
signifies an order of instrumental rationality which appeals to reason, ‘benevolence,’
‘confidence,’ as cultural values that serve the secret fanaticism of a public opinion in turn
devoted to the ‘re-formation’ of the ‘natural’ man” (2-3). Because it privileges the commitment
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to reform above all else, the predominant reading of intercultural contact has the function of
occluding the deaths of thousands.
For this reason, Melville troubles the notion of reform in his novels. The confidence
man’s exchanges with the Missourian farmer, for example, lampoon a strong cultural bias
towards narratives of reform: young boys—all rascals, in the farmer’s opinion—are presented by
the con-man as “incipient creatures” that, with the proper instruction, will transform into
efficacious laborers. To an imagined person who proposes to return an adult servant to the
Philosophical Intelligence Office upon hearing “something unfavorable concerning [the servant]
from some gentleman who employed said adult long before,” the con-man argues—“Madam, or
sir, would you visit upon the butterfly the sins of the caterpillar? In the natural advance of all
creatures, do they not bury themselves over and over again in the endless resurrection of better
and better?” And against the Missourian’s protests, the con-man counters with several examples
of “caterpillars” transformed into “butterflies,” rakes who later prove to be “crude material for
the saint”: “There’s the founder of La Trappe, and Ignatius Loyola, in boyhood, and someway
into manhood, both devil-may-care bloods, and yet, in the end, the wonders of the world for
anchoritish self-command.” In addition, he proffers the example of St. Augustine, who himself
“confesses that, until his thirtieth year, he was a very sad dog” (129-30). All of these examples
demonstrate the cultural predilection to overlay the story of human life with an account of
reform—the story of “the endless resurrection of better and better.”
Typee and The Confidence-Man render the close alliance of practices of benevolence with
the narrative of progress in a disturbing light. It makes sense that The Confidence-Man takes up
an ironic panegyric of the American press, as it is, after all, “one of the most powerful human
agencies that can be employed in forming the mental and moral character of the inhabitants”
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(Suzuki 369) both of the South Seas as well as of North America—in other words, it is one of the
most serviceable tools of human “improvement” within the homeland, as well as an effective
means of shaping how Americans regarded those outside. Frank Goodman engages in exuberant
praise of the American press and is applauded enthusiastically by Charlie Noble. In Frank’s
tribute, we find the following:
[W]hat the sovereign of England is titularly, I hold the press to be actually—
Defender of the Faith!—defender of the faith in the final triumph of truth over
error, metaphysics over superstition, theory over falsehood, machinery over
nature, and the good man over the bad. (171)
Within Frank’s categorization of the triumphs of the press is a subtle and ironic linking-together
of the good man with machinery, with theory, with metaphysics, and with truth. The suggestion,
again, is that the notion of goodness—if founded upon a certain faith in our practices of reading
or reasoning—is no better than machinery, no more substantial than the emptiness that we find
behind the impositions that we call “theory” and “metaphysics” and “truth.” Similarly,
Breitwieser’s analysis of the diminution of human volatility and agency under the auspices of
civilization in Typee provides an apt description for the reductive operations of the cosmopolis in
The Confidence-Man: “America,” he writes, “means both the superstructural promise of selfreliant masterlessness and the infrastructural reduction of persons into units of labor” (17).
Therefore, when Frank eulogizes the press as “the iron Paul” (171), we get the sense of
something utterly discomfiting about the way the press is often used to advance the depredations
of the civilizing mission.
The reach of the influence of the press proves difficult to evade. Often, we see in
Tommo’s expressions the manner in which he seems inadvertently to replicate the missionary
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rhetoric of conversion in the abstract, even while condemning its practical execution (in more
than one sense of the word). For instance, he implores, “Let the savages be civilized, but civilize
them with benefits, and not with evils; and let heathenism be destroyed, but not by destroying the
heathen” (195). His designation of savagery and heathenism adheres to the common usage of
these terms, imbued as they are with an inferior status, and promotes our duty to ameliorate the
natives’ benighted condition—even though, paradoxically, his plea is for a more tolerant manner
of relating to these individuals. Surely, Typee goes some way towards exposing and challenging
the fiction of human improvement that sustains the Polynesian Mission; but in many ways, the
novel also repeats the very same rhetoric that it problematizes so well. Typee, it might be argued,
is a much easier novel to swallow—certainly, it achieved a level of popularity that far surpassed
any of Melville’s subsequent works—because it confirms many of the assumptions already held
by his reading public, governing their perceptions of foreign cultures. The novel satisfies
readerly demands as they are understood by the narrator of The Confidence-Man: “in books of
fiction, [readers] look not only for more entertainment, but, at bottom, even for more reality, than
real life itself can show. Thus, though they want novelty, they want nature, too; but nature
unfettered, exhilarated, in effect transformed” (186-87). The problem is that, like the man with
the mourning weed who tricks the country merchant by offering to “supply the void in [his]
memory” (28), the author of the novel also aids in proliferating the fiction that sustains the lie of
philanthropy.
“Lies, lies, sir,” declaims the barber near the end of The Confidence-Man, “brave lies are
the lions!” (231)—expressing a somewhat disheartening persuasion which, I would argue,
motivates the writing of Melville’s strange final novel. By 1857, Melville has experienced the
immense commercial success of Typee, which made him one of the most well-known authors in
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America seemingly overnight. Yet the insights we garner from The Confidence-Man suggest
Melville’s keen awareness of the ways in which his first novel also embodies a kind of failure.
Though seeking to re-write the terms of his nation’s contact with others, Typee often ends up
rather affirming the very structures that it strives to undermine. According to Samson,
“[Tommo’s] condescending narrative, which labels the natives ‘poor savages’ who are
‘unsophisticated and confiding,’ does as much as the sailors’ promiscuity to foster the
‘contaminating contact’” (56). As much as Typee tries to work against the structures of power, it
often reproduces the terms of oppression. The wise barber, again, makes the astute summation:
“you see, sir, the truth is, that every trade or pursuit which brings one into contact with the facts,
sir, such trade or pursuit is equally an avenue to those facts” (231). With this in mind, The
Confidence-Man’s critique of narrative conventions resembles a form of protest against the
colonial exploitation in which Typee is complicit. In its perplexing disjointedness, its constantly
bringing the reader to the awareness of itself—and of all texts—as a lie, The Confidence-Man
offers perhaps one method of circumventing this double-bind. In what follows, I suggest a
different solution is offered in Pierre.
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4

The failure of literature in Pierre
The struggles endured by Melville as a result of the commercial failure of his final novels

have been well documented. Certainly, the novels of the latter half of the 1850s fall short of
winning the approval of Melville’s reading public, and it may be argued that this is at least partly
due to their repudiation of novelistic conventions that his contemporaries had come to rely on.
But it is possible to identify in The Confidence-Man as well as in Pierre, Melville’s penultimate
novel, a different kind of failure at work. It may be obvious by now, at least in the case of The
Confidence-Man, that Melville seems to evade the endorsement or proposal of any practicable
system of morality. The novel places the reader in a position similar to that of the man described
by Frank Goodman, “who, while convinced that on this continent most wines are shams, yet still
drinks away at them” (167) for, in The Confidence-Man, the “sham” is all the reader is permitted
to access—he is immersed in a world of misreadings. Amid the impossibility of constructing a
viable ethics within such a world, it seems there is nothing to do but succumb to the duplicitous
influence of the masquerade.
If this is a demoralizing conclusion to draw from The Confidence-Man, it certainly
reflects the somewhat disconsolate view of Melville’s later novels that many of his readers have
adopted. Elizabeth Renker, for example, deems that “writing failed Melville in a most crucial
sense, in fact in the sense that mattered most to him: in enabling him to penetrate the world of the
material in order to attain a transcendent realm of Truth” (132). Along similar lines, John Carlos
Rowe’s analysis of Pierre recognizes in the novel a demarcation of the limits of what literature
can do: “Intricately worked out in the very novelistic form Melville had come to detest, his
critique of ideology in Pierre remains a testament to the limits of literature as a force for political
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reform.” According to Rowe, Melville’s disillusionment with the novel form is evident, as he
registers “how powerfully these forms contribute to the social forces of domination they so often
claim to contest” (196). The resistance to coherence and to any pretension to realistic
characterization that we have identified in The Confidence-Man would seem to be motivated by
the same persuasion. In many ways, Melville does seem to repudiate the conventional novelistic
operation, as it tends toward a kind of rationalization, a method of regulating the contingencies
of subjective experience. Melvillean scholars have made much of the fact that he turns
exclusively to writing poetry following the failure of The Confidence-Man, interpreting this shift
as a sign of the author’s final disillusionment with the novel form.
Given the commercial failure of Pierre and The Confidence-Man in the literary
marketplace, I hold nonetheless that in these two novels Melville works through a conception of
failure that differs from our conventional understanding of the term. Pierre, in particular, offers
many clues that suggest a controlled reworking of the idea of failure in its depiction of the life of
its protagonist, the author Pierre Glendinning. At the center of Pierre’s relation to his own failure
is an interrogation of how much, and whether, literature can actually resist the social forces that
it purports to challenge through its exposition. If, as I have claimed, the travelogues that made
Melville’s name among his contemporaries frequently end up restating the terms of exploitation
even as they strive to undermine them, then Pierre becomes a vehicle for an important reexamination of the meaning of literary success.
A more or less constant pessimism regarding novels and what they can do pervades the
text of Pierre. Its protagonist recognizes an attitude of deception in novels’ “false, inverted
attempts at systematizing eternally unsystemizable elements; their audacious, intermeddling
impotency, in trying to unravel, and spread out, and classify the more thin than gossamer threads
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which make up the complex web of life” (141). Pierre inveighs against the traditional formula of
the domestic novel, popular among his contemporaries, having pierced through “all the
speculative lies in them”:
By infallible presentiment he saw, that not always doth life's beginning gloom
conclude in gladness; that wedding-bells peal not ever in the last scene of life's
fifth act; that while the countless tribes of common novels laboriously spin vails
of mystery, only to complacently clear them up at last; and while the countless
tribe of common dramas do but repeat the same; yet the profounder emanations of
the human mind, intended to illustrate all that can be humanly known of human
life; these never unravel their own intricacies, and have no proper endings, but in
imperfect, unanticipated, and disappointing sequels (as mutilated stumps), hurry
to abrupt intermergings with the eternal tides of time and fate. (141)
The novel Pierre, as much as the character of the same name, foregoes the neat trajectory of
gloom to gladness in favor of the bizarre and largely inscrutable “mutilated stumps” that
represent the life of Pierre. Far from clearing up any mystery about human nature, the narrator of
Pierre operates much in the manner of the author described in The Confidence-Man, who, “in
view of its inconsistencies, says of human nature the same that, in view of its contrasts, is said of
divine nature, that it is past finding out” (76).
Melville goes further in disrupting the assumptions of traditional literary representation.
Having witnessed first-hand the harm done to the Marquesans and the role played by travel
narratives and missionary propaganda in perpetuating the unjust treatment of these individuals
under the guise of philanthropy, Melville places a measure of blame upon popular literature for
helping to sustain injustice. As we have seen, real people’s lives are at stake in the authorial
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decision to simplify the “truth” of human nature by measuring it along a scale of fixed and
universal principles. What in The Confidence-Man is treated with frivolity and is rendered in
such a way as to invite laughter is, in Pierre, laid out with a rather graver sense of culpability.
Indeed, Melville places a heavy burden of responsibility upon the author. A revealing
passage in Pierre allows us to identify the imperialistic tendencies of knowledge, along with the
author’s moral obligation, as Melville sees it, to combat them. Pierre’s meditations upon the
production and cancelation of truth convey the vision of an endless struggle:
For it is only the miraculous vanity of man which ever persuades him, that even
for the most richly gifted mind, there ever arrives an earthly period, where it can
truly say to itself, I have come to the Ultimate of Human Speculative Knowledge;
hereafter, at this present point I will abide. Sudden onsets of new truth will assail
him, and overturn him as the Tartars did China, for there is no China Wall that
man can build in his soul, which shall permanently stay the irruptions of those
barbarous hordes which Truth ever nourishes in the loins of her frozen, yet
teeming North, so that the Empire of Human Knowledge can never be lasting in
any one dynasty, since Truth still gives new Emperors to the earth. (167)
Truth, it appears, is neither absolute nor essential; rather, “truths” foist themselves by turns upon
mankind, doing so with the vehemence of a barbarous attack. The primacy of any particular
category of knowledge is established much in the same manner by which empires are
established—with the use of force.
In the novel, Pierre finds a mysterious pamphlet in the coach that bears him away from
his ancestral home. The pamphlet, a strange disquisition on what it calls “Chronometricals and
Horologicals,” reinforces the Melvillean suspicion that the chronometrical virtues (those based
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on celestial, universal principles) are fundamentally incompatible with the horological (that is,
the terrestrial and contingent) existence of individuals. According to the pamphlet, “[t]he
undiluted chronometrical doctrines hitherto taught to mankind” rather produce more vice than
promote virtue. In other words, the pamphlet serves to critique the predominant ethical system
that has no regard for what is contingent and leaves no room for difference.
Within the abstract exposition of the pamphlet, Melville plants a rather concrete image of
what it means for the chronometrical to overrun the horological, and it is a picture replete with
blood:
[I]f any man say, that such a doctrine as this I lay down is false, is impious; I
would charitably refer that man to the history of Christendom for the last 1800
years; and ask him, whether, in spite of all the maxims of Christ, that history is
not just as full of blood, violence, wrong, and iniquity of every kind, as any
previous portion of the world’s story? (215)
Melville reads the political dimension of literary representation not in any abstract way. He
recognizes that not only has the moral doctrine of Christianity “proved entirely impracticable”
(215), it has been used to mask incalculable brutalities.
Melville then follows his vision of “the Empire of Human Knowledge” with an appeal to
action:
If among the deeper significances of its pervading indefiniteness, which
significances are wisely hidden from all but the rarest adepts, the pregnant tragedy
of Hamlet convey any one particular moral at all fitted to the ordinary uses of
man, it is this:—that all meditation is worthless, unless it prompt to action, that it
is not for man to stand shillyshallying amid the conflicting invasions of
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surrounding impulses; that in the earliest instant of conviction, the roused man
must strike, and, if possible, with the precision and the force of the lightning-bolt.
(169)
It is the author’s duty, the narrator of Pierre seems to argue, to act on his convictions. However,
the author’s position is one steeped in paradox. All the world “acts,” as we have seen in the
above discussion of The Confidence-Man, yet there is the sense that any action inevitably fails to
strike through the mask of righteousness. Being itself a novel, Pierre ultimately is faced with its
own limitations—its fundamental inability to actually resist the lie that inheres in the method of
representation. The efforts of Pierre as a novelist—like those of Melville—reveal a selfconscious awareness of the manner in which novels only add to the artifices that sustain power:
For the more and more that he wrote, and the deeper and deeper that he dived,
Pierre saw the everlasting elusiveness of Truth; the universal lurking insincerity
of even the greatest and purest written thoughts. Like knavish cards, the leaves of
all great books were covertly packed. He was but packing one set the more; and
that a very poor jaded set and pack indeed. So that there was nothing he more
spurned, than his own aspirations; nothing he more abhorred than the loftiest part
of himself. (339)
Pierre’s activity resembles Melville’s own writing of Typee, insofar as it represents a process that
ensures the unceasing rehearsal of the conditions of power. Paradoxically, the more intensely
Pierre attempts to get at the truth behind appearances through his writing, the more his pages end
up merely adding to the strata of misperceptions, thus effectively rendering the attainment of that
truth ever more out of reach.
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In the end, like the pamphlet on “Chronometricals and Horologicals” that Pierre finds on
his journey, the novel Pierre is “more the excellently illustrated re-statement of a problem, than
the solution of the problem itself” (210). Given that advancing any solution or any truth would
only serve to pack “one set the more” of knavish cards, the narrator of Pierre rather opts for a
kind of failure. At several moments, the novel declines to fulfill its narrative function—it refuses
to narrate, for example, Pierre’s wrangling with his extraordinary predicament: “[H]ere,” the
narrator states, “we draw a vail.” Rather than describing or explaining Pierre’s struggles, he
maintains, “Some nameless struggles of the soul can not be painted, and some woes will not be
told. Let the ambiguous procession of events reveal their own ambiguousness” (181). The
“reason-originating heart and mind of man” longs for explanation within the “imperfect,
unanticipated, and disappointing” text, but the text withholds explanation—the mysteries of
Pierre’s life, it claims, “are not so easily to be expounded” (209). Desisting from using words or
reason to attempt to clear up these mysteries, the text instead renders the impression of “a divine
unidentifiableness” (89).
Self-consciously, the narrator describes the method of his own narration: “This history
goes forward and goes backward, as occasion calls” (54). He depicts the life of Pierre as
“mutilated stumps” because, as we have seen, the effort to fit the contingencies of human life
into an overarching pattern amounts to mere pretension and even to a kind of imperialism. In this
manner, the narrator evades the work of conventional literature, in which “all objects are
deceptively foreshortened, . . . each object is viewed as detached, so that essentially and
relatively every thing is misseen” (175). Bearing in mind the failure of literature to do anything
but re-present—to reproduce, at bottom—the terms and conditions of power, I interpret Pierre’s
refusal to narrate as a manner of opting out of the confidence game of modernity. In bringing to
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the fore its own insufficiency as a novel, Pierre affirms failure as a way—perhaps the only
way—to avoid participating in the inhumanities of empire.
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